| The fascinating thing about Alan Greenspan is his
financial pragmatism. Economics is a very fashion conscious and trendy pursuit.
Unfortunately, like all academic disciplines, it is a very political process of
theoretical supposition. Keynesians explained the Great Depression, pointed the
way out and came to dominate economics faculties around the world. Monetarists
explained the stagflation of the 1970s and replaced the Keynesians. Since
economists seem to have a "take no prisoner" approach to their
particular brand of analysis that meant that most economists who came work at
central banks and monetary authorities had been thoroughly indoctrinated in the
"proper" way to look at things. Like generals at the start of a
conflict, they typically fight the last war (usually ineptly).
Enter Alan Greenspan, economic pragmatist extraordinaire. His
experience and training was in practical economics, working as an economic
forecaster never very far from the political corridors of power. He admired the
rugged individualism espoused by Ayn Rand. Replacing the zealous Paul Volcker
who slew the inflation dragron, he was tested very quickly in the 1987 stock
market crash. Drawing upon financial history and understanding the importance
of confidence to the financial system, he emulated the financial
confidence-building of J.P. Morgan by very visibly making funds available to
stem market panic.
"Early on Tuesday morning, October 20th, we issued a
statement indicating that the Federal Reserve stood ready to provide liquidity
to the economy and financial markets. In support of that policy, we maintained
a highly visible presence
underscoring our intent to keep markets
liquid." Alan Greenspan
The effect of these words and actions on financial market
participants was immediate. The federal reserve would inject large quantities
of cash into the market. There was no question that the Fed had sufficient
funds to do so, it could create as much money as it wanted. Banks did not have
to call loans to investment dealers to preserve their own capital. Panic was
stemmed and the markets again started their upwards march that lasted through
the 1990s. Compare Greenpan's actions to the hapless head of the Japanese
monetary authority who declared that the stock market was not his worry during
the meltdown of their stock market in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Japan
entered a recession that it has yet to come out of!
What one learns from this book is that Alan Greenspan is not an
economic moralist. He doesn't think that risk taking is bad and should be
punished. In fact, Greenspan thinks that it is the job of the monetary
authority to prevent "systemic risk" and remove the need for other
economic agents to hold reserves in case of very negative market and economic
scenarios.
He also isn't an economic ideologue. Compared to the 1990s
central bank vogue of "zero inflation" he has waged a moderate war on
inflation. Canada, New Zealand, Germany and France all waged their absurd fight
for zero inflation at a very high cost to their economies. Greenspan allowed
the markets to run which allowed resources to be devoted to further lowering
the cost of goods and services to American consumers. He understood that
expansion of nominal cashflows was essential for investors to be confident of
the economic future.
Where this book falls down is in its lack of analysis of the
particular set of circumstances that allowed Greenspan the latitude to wash
huge amounts of liquidity through the U.S. financial system without substantive
inflation. Clearly, being the world's reserve currency removed the prospect of
a currency crisis. Having virtually all of the world's tradable commodities and
manufactured goods priced in U.S. dollars meant that inflated money supply
would not lead to higher input prices due to currency depreciation.
The Greenspan response to the Long Term Capital hedge fund
crisis is also omitted from the book, perhaps though timing. Given that
Greenspan rescued the investment dealers and banks that dealt with this inanely
speculative fund, one has to question how far the "systemic risk" net
can be cast before Greenspan's Fed becomes a classic regulator
"captured" by its industry. A friend of mine attended a conference in
the Far East last year that featured Hong Kong monetary officials being highly
praised for rescuing their stock market by buying up a good part of it with
foreign currency reserves. It seems that Greenspanian intervention is now the
new central bank vogue. Could the "no lose" central bank regulated
stock market be Greenspan's true legacy?
No matter what your economic bias, this book will help you
understand one of the most important reasons for our current long period of
economic growth and stock market increase. A must read for the serious and
professional investor.
Review by: John Carswell,
President, Canso Investment Counsel Ltd.
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